CRS Report R48-2291 | Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress | Updated March 2036
Prepared by Daniel J. Kowalski, Specialist in Space and Aeronautics Policy, and Sarah E. Tran, Analyst in Science and Technology Policy.
Overview
The report provides the United States Congress with a current status assessment of the Artemis Lunar Surface Outpost (ALSO) — the United States’ first permanent lunar surface installation, established with the Artemis VII landing of August 2035 at the Shackleton Crater rim (89.86°S, 222.7°E) on the lunar south pole. ALSO is the third human-operated facility in the Shackleton Crater region, following the Soviet Zvezda base (operational February 2033) and the Chinese Guanghan base (operational November 2034).
All three installations lie within a 4-kilometre arc on the Shackleton rim, within line-of-sight of one another. ALSO is approximately 480 metres from Guanghan and 2.3 kilometres from Zvezda.
ALSO Architecture and Status
ALSO consists of a single pressurised habitat module — a derivative of the Boeing Commercial Crew Transportation System crew module, modified for long-duration surface operations — delivered as an integrated lander payload aboard a SpaceX Starship HLS vehicle. The module has not been expanded since its landing. Key specifications:
- Habitable volume: 47 m³ pressurised (38 m³ effective working volume)
- Crew capacity: 3 design maximum; missions operate with 2-person crews
- Power: Deployable solar arrays (28 kWe peak); lithium-sulfur battery storage (72-hour reserve). No nuclear power capability.
- Life support: Closed-loop atmospheric revitalisation; 87% water recovery efficiency
- Communications: Direct-to-Earth X-band; relay via NASA LRO and commercial Intuitive Machines LunaNet node
- Surface mobility: One unpressurised rover (ASMV-2), 12 km operational range
The outpost is not continuously occupied. It is staffed during Artemis surface missions (14–21 days each, 2–3 missions per year) and powered down between missions. Cumulative occupancy as of March 2036: 63 days across three missions (Artemis VII, VIII, IX). Projected annual occupancy: 40–60 days (approximately 11–17% of calendar days).
ALSO has no in-situ resource utilisation (ISRU) capability. All consumables are supplied from Earth.
Comparative Analysis
The capability gap between ALSO and its co-located international counterparts is substantial across multiple measures:
| Feature | Zvezda (Soviet) | Guanghan (CNSA) | ALSO (NASA) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operational since | Feb 2033 | Nov 2034 | Aug 2035 |
| Assembly method | Orbital (MTSS) | Orbital (Tiangong-derived) | Direct-land single piece |
| Habitable volume | ~140 m³ | ~115 m³ | ~47 m³ |
| Continuous occupancy | Yes (since Mar 2033) | Yes (since Jan 2035) | No (~15% of year) |
| Power generation | BN-L1 fast reactor, ~750 kWe | Solar + BN-L1, ~310 kWe | Solar + batteries, ~28 kWe |
| Water ISRU | Yes (PSR ice extraction) | Yes (PSR ice extraction) | No |
| He-3 extraction | Pilot facility, operational | Pilot facility, operational | None |
| He-3 produced (cumulative) | Est. 180–220 g | Est. 140–170 g | 0 g |
| Annual surface crew-hours (est.) | ~26,000 | ~19,000 | ~1,400 |
Power differential: ALSO’s 28 kWe represents 3.7% of Zvezda’s generating capacity and 9% of Guanghan’s. Nuclear surface power (kilopower-class) is in Phase C development but not manifested on any Artemis mission through Artemis XIV (current planning horizon FY2038).
Crew-hours differential: The disparity — 26,000 annually at Zvezda versus ~1,400 at ALSO — implies Soviet personnel will accumulate more lunar surface operational experience in a single year than American personnel will across the entire projected Artemis surface programme through 2040.
The Helium-3 Strategic Question
Helium-3 surface concentration at the Shackleton rim has been independently measured at 2.8–3.6 ppb by mass — consistent with the CNSA-published figure from earlier Chang’e programme measurements. The south polar region is estimated to contain 800,000 to 1.2 million tonnes of recoverable He-3.
Zvezda and Guanghan have collectively produced an estimated 320–390 grams of extracted He-3 as of March 2036, with production rates increasing. ALSO has produced zero grams. No ALSO mission has included He-3 extraction or systematic survey equipment in its science manifest.
The Kurchatov Institute announced in October 2035 that its T-22 experimental reactor had achieved sustained D-He3 plasma confinement for 8.3 seconds — a significant milestone that does not constitute a path to commercial fusion, but that the institute characterised as confirmation of confinement parameters developed using the RAZUM computational modelling system.
CRS notes as established fact:
- The Soviet Union and China are extracting He-3 from the lunar surface. The United States is not.
- The Soviet fusion programme (Kurchatov Institute, T-series tokamak) is institutionally connected to MTSS, which receives He-3 samples from Zvezda Base.
- The United States has no approved programme for lunar He-3 extraction.
- A programme decision in FY2038 would produce operational extraction capability no earlier than 2047–2048.
The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy described its posture as “monitoring and assessing” — which CRS notes is not a programme.
Options for Congressional Consideration
The report identifies four options without recommendation:
- Maintain current programme — ALSO remains a short-stay science outpost. Gap continues to widen.
- Enhanced Artemis (incremental expansion) — Additional habitat, kilopower unit, water ISRU demo. Does not address He-3 strategic question.
- Artemis with He-3 extraction mandate — New programme start, orbital assembly, nuclear surface power. $18–24B over FY2038–2048. By operational date, Soviet and Chinese facilities will have been extracting He-3 for 13–15 years.
- International partnership — Resource-sharing arrangement with existing operators. Wolf Amendment modification required for US-CNSA cooperation; political feasibility assessed as low with the Soviet Union.
Significance
The CRS report is significant as the most comprehensive documented assessment of the American lunar position at a moment when the strategic divergence in lunar capability had become measurable and publicly acknowledged by an official analytical body. The report’s factual presentation — that the United States had produced zero grams of lunar He-3 while its competitors had produced hundreds, that the power and occupancy differentials were structural rather than incidental, that a programme decision made immediately would produce results a decade after existing operations had matured — constitutes a formal documentation of the capability gap that earlier sources (Osei in 2031, Marsh in 2030) had analysed from outside government.
The report also provides the first documented evidence of the Kurchatov T-22 D-He3 confinement milestone (October 2035) and of the operational characteristics of the Zvezda and Guanghan bases, including their BN-L1 fast reactor power figures and cumulative He-3 production estimates.
Related sources: Osei, Left at the Airlock (2031) | The Atlantic: The Moon Doesn’t Care Who Wins (2030) | CNSA: Chang’e-10 Crewed Landing Announcement (2029) | Zvezda Memorandum (1965) | Volkov, The Burning Soil (2029)